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CRA reporting platform v1.1: workflows and exceptional dissemination

ENISA's 12 October platform update prompts a refresh of reporting procedures; statutory dates and clocks remain unchanged.

European Union
Product-security reporting and operational assurance
Guidance
Official source reviewed

PrivacyBuilt Editorial · Source published Platform launch and operational update · Reviewed 20 October 2026 · 7 min read

The 60-second summary

ENISA confirms that the CRA Single Reporting Platform was upgraded to version 1.1 on 12 October 2026. This update refreshes the launch briefing with current resources and dissemination guidance. Manufacturer reporting has applied since 11 September 2026; relevant open-source steward reporting starts on 11 December 2027. Existing 24-hour and 72-hour legal clocks are unchanged. The PEC workflow concerns exceptional dissemination handling for the 72-hour actively exploited vulnerability notification; it is not a reporting deadline extension.

Timeline that matters

  1. 11 September 2026

    Platform and manufacturer reporting live

    ENISA deployed the initial platform capability and manufacturer reporting obligations began.

  2. Within 24 hours of awareness

    Early warning

    Submit the required early warning for a qualifying event.

  3. Within 72 hours of awareness

    Notification

    Submit the fuller notification identified by Commission guidance.

  4. 11 December 2027

    Open-source steward reporting

    Article 24(3) reporting applies to relevant open-source software stewards.

  5. 12 October 2026

    Platform version 1.1

    ENISA confirms the upgrade and says documentation reflects the changes.

  6. 20 October 2026

    Next review

    Recheck operational documentation; editorial date only.

What changed

Updated 20 October 2026 following ENISA's 15 October FAQ additions on mistaken notifications and EUVD coordination. Existing reporting clocks and application dates remain unchanged. Updated 13 October 2026: this briefing now includes ENISA's confirmed 12 October platform version 1.1 upgrade, current operational resources, exceptional dissemination handling, independent deadline tracking and submission evidence. Statutory reporting dates and clocks remain unchanged. The update does not assert that every described workflow was introduced in version 1.1.

Who should pay attention?

Manufacturers and product owners

Determine product scope and make qualifying notifications through the live platform.

Security and incident-response teams

Connect detection and triage to the 24-hour and 72-hour reporting clocks.

Legal and privacy teams

Validate role, threshold, disclosure and confidentiality decisions.

Engineering and vulnerability teams

Provide traceable technical evidence, mitigation status and corrective-measure dates.

Supply-chain and vendor-risk teams

Require timely upstream and downstream escalation of potentially reportable events.

What the guidance clarifies

The reporting channel is operational
ENISA deployed the initial operating capability of the Single Reporting Platform on 11 September 2026.
Manufacturer reporting has started
Manufacturers must report qualifying actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents from 11 September 2026.
The clocks are staged
The Commission identifies an early warning within 24 hours, a fuller notification within 72 hours and later final-report deadlines.
Open-source stewards have a different date
Article 24(3) reporting applies to relevant open-source software stewards from 11 December 2027.
One submission is distributed
The coordinating CSIRT receives the notification, relevant CSIRTs can receive it, and ENISA receives access through the platform.
This operationalises existing law
The launch does not create a new legal instrument; it makes the CRA reporting mechanism available as the duties begin.
Existing law continues
The upgrade does not change application dates or reporting clocks.
PEC workflow
The current guidance applies PEC at the 72-hour actively exploited vulnerability stage. The coordinating CSIRT decides dissemination; the full notification may not immediately reach ENISA.
Version attribution
Some linked pages retain earlier update dates. This revision reports current instructions and the confirmed upgrade, without asserting every workflow was introduced in version 1.1.
Mistaken submissions
Only the coordinating CSIRT can close a report. A closure request does not suspend any outstanding reporting duties.
EUVD coordination
ENISA may contact the manufacturer about adding publicly known vulnerability information to the EUVD in agreement with it. This is separate from mandatory notification timing.

Why this matters for global organisations.

Reporting tools and documentation evolve while legal clocks continue to run. Rehearse access, submission and exceptional disclosure decisions, retain receipts and keep an independent record of awareness and deadlines.

17 actions to start now

  1. Reconfirm product and entity scope and reporting roles.
  2. Record accountable reporting owners and backups.
  3. Check current user status, association and access restrictions.
  4. Replace outdated internal screenshots and links with current guidance.
  5. Retain awareness timestamps and calculate legal deadlines independently.
  6. Distinguish actively exploited vulnerabilities from severe incidents.
  7. Rehearse all reporting stages without submitting fictional events to the live portal.
  8. Verify coordinating CSIRT and submission routing.
  9. Assess exceptional dissemination grounds with legal and security specialists.
  10. Record the grounds and disclosure risks supporting any PEC request.
  11. Confirm actual submission and retain receipts; a saved draft is insufficient.
  12. Maintain an outage escalation procedure using current official instructions.
  13. Track corrective or mitigating measure availability for vulnerability final reports.
  14. Protect sensitive submission evidence and limit access.
  15. Recheck instructions after platform updates and record helpdesk questions.
  16. For mistaken submissions, request closure through the coordinating CSIRT or the additional-note field; retain the response and do not assume the request itself closes the report.
  17. Assign an owner for ENISA enquiries about adding publicly known vulnerabilities to the EUVD; record agreement, disclosure review and timing.

Suggested next steps

  • Review current documentation and retest internal reporting procedures, including exceptional dissemination assessments. Retain independent deadline calculations and submission receipts.

Evidence worth retaining

  • Product and entity scope assessments.
  • Manufacturer and supply-chain role determinations.
  • Named reporting owners and escalation contacts.
  • Platform registration, access-control and test records.
  • Incident and vulnerability intake timestamps.
  • Awareness-time rationale and reporting-clock calculations.
  • Threshold assessments and legal review notes.
  • Copies and receipts of early warnings, notifications, updates and final reports.
  • Technical indicators, affected versions and exploitation evidence.
  • Corrective-measure, patch and customer-communication records.
  • CSIRT routing and product-availability analysis.
  • Tabletop results, remediation actions and management reporting.
  • Current documentation review and version record.
  • Independent deadline ledger and submission receipts.
  • PEC assessment and dissemination correspondence, where applicable.
  • Mistaken-report closure requests and coordinating-CSIRT responses.
  • EUVD coordination, disclosure approval and agreement records.

Questions to take to counsel or your conformity team

These are discussion prompts, not legal advice or conclusions.

  • Which entities are manufacturers for each product supplied to the relevant market?
  • What event establishes organisational awareness and starts the reporting clock?
  • How will teams distinguish an actively exploited vulnerability from other vulnerabilities?
  • What criteria identify a severe incident affecting product security?
  • Can the business assemble a defensible early warning within 24 hours?
  • Who approves a submission when facts remain uncertain?
  • Which information could create security, confidentiality, contractual or privacy risks if disclosed?
  • How are supplier and customer notices coordinated with the CRA submission?
  • What evidence supports a decision not to report?
  • Which separate notification regimes may apply to the same event?
  • Which internal procedures need retesting after the platform update?
  • Does a PEC request meet legal conditions without delaying the underlying report?
  • How will legal deadlines be tracked independently of reminders?
  • Who owns error-correction requests and vulnerability-record enquiries?

Official sources

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